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ABSTRACT: The study of musical timbre by Bailes (2007) raises important
questions concerning the relative ease of imaging complex perceptual attributes such as
timbre, compared to more unidimensional attributes.  I also raise the issue of individual
differences in auditory imagery ability, especially for timbre.
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TIMBRE has a somewhat paradoxical status in music psychology.  The literature on timbre perception and
memory is small compared to music cognition studies on dimensions such as pitch and rhythm.  On the one
hand,  we find that people can discriminate and classify timbre reasonably well. This is demonstrated in the
pretests of the article by Bailes (2007) as well as in numerous studies showing that musical timbres are
mentally represented in a regular manner, some of which Bailes cites.  And of course, composers select and
then change timbres to convey various musical messages.
On the other hand, timbre perception is influenced by pitch (Krumhansl & Iverson, 1992),
suggesting it is not an independent dimension.  It is also not an easy dimension to remember:  I have
numerous experiments in my bottom drawer showing a failure of participants to remember what instrument
played a given tune during a study list.  Even indirect demonstrations of timbre memory can be hard to
obtain.  In a musical stem completion task, I found no effect of timbre change on ability to remember
explicitly, by singing the requested note, what note came next after the first few notes of a studied tune was
played.  Nor did I find a detrimental effect of timbre change on the implicit task of producing a note that
“sounded good,” where a higher rate of correct completions on studied vs. unstudied items would indicate
preserved implicit memory (Warker & Halpern, 2005).
Matching a timbre to an entire tune may be a challenging binding task.  The few studies in timbre
imagery have typically asked participants to imagine single notes.  Crowder (1989) found interference
effects from timbre in a pitch-matching task when the imagined tone of one pitch did not match the actual
tone of another pitch (also showing the pitch-timbre interdependence referred to above).  Pitt and Crowder
(1992) likewise used single tones to investigate spectral vs. dynamic aspects of timbre imagery. And
Halpern et al. (2004) asked participants to imagine single tones of various instruments for a similarity
rating task.  All of these studies used single tones for a good reason: to insure that the timbre in question
was active in working memory at the time the particular discrete judgment was made.  And they also serve
to show that people can (in the case of similarity judgments) or must (in the case of interference effects)
reactivate what appear to be perceptual-like representations of timbre.
Bailes points out that it would also be useful to examine timbre imagery for more extended
musical passages, although it is perhaps unduly strong to say that the previous studies cannot be
generalized at all to the extended situation.   The current study has some similarities to previous ones, in
that some comparison is made between perceptual and imaginal judgments.  Also congruent with previous
studies, judgments made when part of the stimulus is imagined led to lower performance levels than when
the stimulus is heard.  As we pointed out in our 2004 article, participants in Crowder’s (1989) study were
about 500 ms slower to carry out pitch matching when the first note of a pair was imagined rather than
heard, and in one of our earlier studies, average accuracy in a pitch comparison task within a song fell from
85% in a heard version to 73% when the song was imagined (Zatorre & Halpen, 1993).  In the 2004 study,
the multidimensional scaling solution for imagined instruments was less regular than that for perceived
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instruments (although the fit of the model was equally good in both cases). All of these studies converge on
showing that reactivated information provides some information, but not all the information necessary to
make timbre-related judgments.
Bailes takes a different tack in both the method and conceptualization of imagery in this article.  In
both studies she asks participants to memorize a piece of music.  In the first study, she then asks them to
compare a sounded note pair against a memory of that note pair for a same-different judgment on timbre,
and manipulates whether the rest of the memorized piece is sounded or not.  So two things are really going
on here: a) matching a timbre representation to that supposedly in long-term memory and b) using the
sounded intervening notes as a memory aid, insofar that it is likely that the immediately preceding note pair
acts as a cue (or contrast) to the next, to-be-judged note pair.  In the second study, the timbre judgment is a
more subtle change, but still involves, or could involve, the two aspects described above: memory for the
learned timbre per se, and making use of the contrast from the information immediately preceding the to-
be-judged phrase.  Because results of the first study are potentially open to alternative explanations
involving practice effects, I prefer to concentrate on the second study.
The main result is that time to make the judgment (I assume this includes all trials, as we are not
told that RT is only to correct trials) decreases from perception to imagery to control. This latter condition
took place before the piece was learned and was meant to capture pure discrimination.  Accuracy showed
the inverse pattern in one piece and did not vary for the other piece.   We of course would not be surprised
that actually hearing immediately preceding phrases in the baseline timbre would facilitate making a subtle
contrast with a successive timbre.  Thus the data of interest comes from comparing imagery vs. control.   In
three of four tests (RT and accuracy x 2 pieces), imagery of the context did apparently facilitate the contrast
judgment.
However, it is worthwhile examining the control condition before accepting this conclusion
absolutely.  The control condition took place before the piece was learned.  It is possible that repeated
listening of the piece might have sharpened the ability to discriminate that heard timbre, either the overall
palette or the notes immediately preceding the target, from a filtered sound.  Presenting the control
condition after the learning phase is feasible if one simply asks the participant to compare the two extracts
without mention of imagery or intervening music. This would be a more conclusive test of whether directed
imagery of intervening music improves discrimination.  Assuming imagery still shows superiority over
control, then we would indeed have evidence from a new kind of indirect test of the ability of people to
imagine more complex timbres than have been used previously (although not knowing the pieces in
question, I do not actually know what the timbres were). However, we still must be cautious in assuming
that an extended phrase of music was imagined successfully, as the task could be done by imagining a
small excerpt of the piece immediately preceding the target measure.
The other way in which this study differs from the other studies in timbre imagery is that by the
participants’ own admission, they were unable to imagine the timbre.  In almost all studies of imagery that I
am familiar with, both auditory and visual, an assumption and a finding is that participants re-experience
the percept in some way. In some studies they are directed to do so, in other studies, such as with mental
rotation, they report with high frequency an ability to “call up” the requested information and then to
operate on it.  I consulted several cognitive psychology textbooks on my shelf and most defined mental
imagery by referring to the representation of something similar to sensory experience.  Thus I am not
entirely convinced that the current participants were using “imagery” as the term is standardly used, unless
we simply equate “imagery” with any memory representation.  In these experiments, it is possible that
participants could have coded the baseline timbre in an abstract or verbal way.  Eliciting the subjective
experience of imagery would be important in any future studies of timbre imagery for these more complex
materials, in my opinion.
Nevertheless, the inability of many of Bailes’s volunteers to imagine timbre as standardly defined
raised the question of individual differences in auditory imagery ability.  Crowder (1989) found that several
of his participants were absolutely unable to ignore timbre (imagined or heard) in making pitch judgments.
This suggests a good ability to call up images but an inability to control the process thereafter.  Aleman,
Nieuwenstein, Böcker, and de Haan (2000) compared musicians and nonmusicians in a musical pitch
comparison task that was similar to the one Zatorre and I used (1993), a nonmusical auditory imagery task,
and a visual imagery task. Musicians were superior to nonmusicians in both auditory tasks, but not the
visual task, again suggesting individual differences based on training (or propensity).  In my lab, I routinely
either ask for two years of musical training as a criterion for entry into even simple auditory imagery
studies, because I do occasionally find people seemingly incapable of generating or maintaining images.  I
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also use a questionnaire asking people to self-rate vividness and ability to control mental images, and find a
wide range in this self-report (and lower ratings, on average, than parallel items for visual imagery).
Thus we have hints that people may vary quite a bit on ability to image musical dimensions, and it
is possible that this variability would be exaggerated in aspects more difficult to imagine.  Certainly
imagining anything extended in time would put stress on working memory structures, and even for brief
stimuli, Pitt and Crowder (1992) showed that the dynamic element of timbre was hard to imagine.  A long
passage of music therefore changes in time on both a fine scale (dynamic aspects of timbre) and a coarser
one (as notes and rhythms unfold).   Thus it may not be surprising that consciously imagining timbre of an
extended passage would be quite challenging and perhaps only accessible to those with large working
memory spans, musical training, or both. This hypothesis could be tested in future work.
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